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 ABSTRACT 
 
Past research demonstrates that free-time is an important resource for political participation. We 
investigate whether two central drains on citizens’ daily time—working and commuting—impact 
their level of political participation. The prevailing “resources” model offers a quantity-focused 
view where additional time spent working or commuting reduces free-time and should each 
separately decrease participation. We contrast this view to a “commuter’s strain” hypothesis, 
which emphasizes time spent in transit as a psychologically onerous burden over and above the 
workday. Using national survey data, we find that time spent working has no effect on 
participation, while commuting significantly decreases participation. We incorporate this finding 
into a comprehensive model of the “daily grind,” which factors in both socioeconomic status and 
political interest. Our analysis demonstrates that commuting leads to the greatest loss in political 
interest for low income Americans, and that this loss serves as a main mechanism through which 
commuting erodes political participation. 
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“In general, Americans are busy earning their livings and raising their families. They are not very well informed 
about politics and public affairs, do not care a great deal about politics, do not hold many of their views strongly, 
and are not ideological.” –Morris Fiorina 
 
“Politics is the sideshow to the great circus of life” –Robert Dahl 
  
For most Americans, the “daily grind” refers to the constant stream of obligatory daily 
activities that consume the greater part of one’s awake life. Over the past quarter century, the 
daily grind is expanding beyond the time spent at one’s job to include the precious and ever-
increasing minutes a day spent by Americans getting to and from work. In 2010, the average 
hours per day spent on work and work-related activities for working Americans was 8.23 hours 
on weekdays and 5.23 on weekends
1
. While it is a matter of debate whether Americans are 
working longer hours now than in the mid 20
th
 century (Putnam, 2000), Americans are 
undeniably spending more time commuting to work. In 1990, of Americans who did not work 
from home, about 30% had commutes of 30 minutes or longer; in 2009, this figure rose to 35%, 
representing an increase in time spent commuting for over 12 million Americans. Indeed, 
Americans spent a total of 55.6 million hours commuting to work in 2009 compared to 41.6 
million in 1990
2
. The general question of this article is what effect, if any, does the time spent 
working and commuting have on citizens’ level of political participation? Further, with more 
Americans engaging in longer commutes, a question of central importance is whether the time 
spent getting to and from work affects political engagement.  
In this article, we engage these questions by contrasting a dominant theoretical 
framework in the political participation literature to an alternative approach derived from 
literature in psychology and behavioral economics. The former is a resources-centered model, 
which focuses on concrete assets, such as free-time, money, and skills, that enable and foster 
                                                          
1
 Figures obtained from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics’ 2010 Time-Use Survey. 
2
 All figures obtained from the 1990 Decennial Census and the 2009 American Community Survey from the U.S. 
Census Bureau.  
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political engagement. This model would suggest that by their common consumption of the 
quantity of free-time usable for performing one’s role as citizen, increased time spent working 
and commuting should each contribute to a decrease in engagement in political activities. In 
contrast to the quantity-focus of the resources model, we offer an alternative approach that 
emphasizes impacts associated with specific qualities of time consuming daily activities, such as 
their differential depletion of psychological resources and/or induction of negative emotions. 
This alternative approach leads to a “commuter’s strain” hypothesis, which argues that an 
increase in time spent commuting will more strongly dampen political engagement than 
additional time spent working. This alternative prediction is based upon the presumption—
supported by research in behavioral economics and industrial/organizational psychology—that 
time spent commuting involves a higher degree of depletion of psychological resources and 
incurrence of negative emotions than time spent on the job.  
Drawing upon national survey data, this article analyzes the independent effects of time 
spent working and commuting on political participation. Our results indicate that, even after 
controlling for a variety of relevant individual and contextual factors, time spent working exerts 
no impact on one’s level of participation. An increase in time spent commuting, however, is 
found to lead to a significant decrease in participation. In unpacking this main effect, we offer 
and empirically validate a comprehensive theoretical model for the impact of the daily grind on 
citizen participation. This model integrates leading “SES” and “resources” models of 
participation (Brady, Verba, & Schlozman, 1995) into a comprehensive framework that situates 
individual income and interest in politics as key factors serving to condition and channel the 
effect of commuting on the level of participation of working Americans. We find that political 
interest serves as a significant mediator between commuting and political participation, but that 
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this mediated effect is itself moderated by individual income. Among lower income Americans, 
a longer commute leads to a significant erosion of interest in politics, and this in turn leads to 
significant decreases in participation. Among higher income Americans however, the 
relationship is reversed; increased time spent commuting among those with the highest income is 
found to significantly enhance interest, which in turn, increases levels of participation.  
Our theory and findings make several contributions to the study of political participation 
and have important implications for citizenship and democracy in the U.S. First, our research 
moves beyond past work by directly engaging the issue of the impact of the daily grind on 
citizen engagement and analyzing the effects of work and commuting separately. We find that 
while work consumes much more of the average Americans’ daily time relative to commuting, it 
is the latter component of the daily grind that impacts political interest and engagement. As the 
process of urban and suburban sprawl continue, and the trend of more commuters and increased 
commuting times persists, activists and mobilizers will have to contend with a powerful societal-
level process depleting citizens’ psychological resources and thus undermining mass 
participation in the nations’ political life. Second, our theory and analyses bring money into the 
equation in a new manner by showing that income moderates the effect of the daily grind, such 
that low income individuals are the ones most “ground down” by long daily commutes, as 
manifest in reductions in their level of psychological engagement with politics. In finding that 
the negative impacts of commuting are mostly concentrated among those at the lower end of the 
income distribution, our results suggest that the societal processes increasingly forcing 
commuting on individuals, and leading to longer commuting times, are working to further 
distance an already weakly active and often marginalized segment of the populace from the 
democratic process.   
4 
 
DAILY DEMANDS AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 
In asking why citizens fail to participate in politics, the standing wisdom in the political 
participation literature is “because they can’t, because they don’t want to, or because nobody 
asked” (Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995). These three factors allude to resources, interest, and 
mobilization, and collectively comprise the “resources” model of mass political participation in 
America. One of the key resources in this model is time, with a principle finding being that 
citizens with more free-time are more likely to participate in politics (Brady et al., 1995; 
Schlozman, Burns, & Verba, 1994). This finding forms a conventional wisdom; namely, that for 
most Americans, performing one’s role as citizen competes with work and family, and more 
often than not, loses out to these daily demands. In short, the standing belief is that the “daily 
grind” consumes the majority of Americans’ daily time and attention and leaves little left over to 
be invested in performing one’s role of citizen in political life. This standing wisdom, however, 
relies upon data collected in 1989 and the use of an “omnibus” measure of free-time that fails to 
analyze the independent effects of time spent on different obligatory daily activities. These 
characteristics of the evidence in support of the resources model are of interest because society 
has undergone significant changes since the late 1980’s with respect to obligatory daily-time use. 
To be sure, one prominent and persisting change in daily life for Americans is the need to 
commute to work and increasing time spent in transit. Several questions loom large: what effect 
does commuting have on political engagement, and how do these effects, if any, compare to 
those of the other primary consumer of citizens’ daily time—work.  
The answer provided by the resources model is relatively clear: free-time is an essential 
resource for political participation, thus any activity that consumes this time should consequently 
decrease participation. Given their common consumption of free-time, the resources model 
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would predict that longer hours at work and more time in transit should each have a negative 
effect on engagement. Further, one could even conclude from the logic of the resources model 
that work, by consuming a far greater share of time in the day than even a long commute, should 
exert a more pronounced negative effect on participation than commuting. These predictions 
regarding the effect of the daily grind on participation as offered by a resources model have not 
been subjected to much direct empirical testing. As noted, Brady et al. (1995) rely upon an 
omnibus measure of free-time that does not analyze the separate effects of different time 
consuming activities; further, their measure, while accounting for time spent working, doing 
chores, studying and/or going to school, and sleeping—does not account for the time spent 
commuting. Thus, while we do know that less free-time decreases participation, we do not know 
whether some consumers of free-time matter more than others in driving this effect.  
At present, the scant existing research analyzing the effects of work hours and 
commuting on participation either produce results seemingly inconsistent with the resources 
model or render mixed results. In the case of work, one of the most prominent findings in the 
participation literature is the positive correlation between work hours and civic engagement 
(Putnam, 2000). More specifically, Putnam (2000) finds that employed people are more active 
civically and socially than those outside the paid labor force, and that among paid workers, 
longer hours are often associated with more civic engagement, not less. This finding—which has 
yet to be subjected to much further replication by other participation scholars—clearly 
contradicts the resources model’s prediction with respect to free time. Turning to commuting, 
however, the effects are more inconclusive. Leading research in the U.S. finds that longer 
individual commutes unequivocally erode social ties and local civic engagement (Putnam, 2000; 
Williamson, 2002). This effect, however, does not appear to extend to participation in the 
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broader political arena, as several studies find that individual commuting has no effect on general 
forms of political participation (e.g., voting, attending a political rally, contacting one's 
Congressperson, discussing politics) in the U.S. (Hopkins & Williamson, 2012; Humphries, 
2001; Oliver, 2001; Williamson, 2002) or in Sweden (Lidström, 2006). To add further 
complexity to the small body of work on commuting, several studies—some of which find no 
effect for individual commuting—find that residing in suburban contexts with more long-
distance and single-occupant vehicle commuters decreases civic engagement and political 
participation (Freeman, 2001; Hopkins & Williamson, 2012; Humphries, 2001; Williamson, 
2002).  
In short, when it comes to understanding the impact of citizens’ daily grind of work and 
commuting on their level of political participation, we come away from the small body of 
existing research with an uncomfortable degree of uncertainty. In the case of Brady et al. (1998), 
the results are based upon decades old data and the analysis does not include commuting or 
analyze the effects of various obligatory activities separately. In the case of the handful of studies 
directly addressing commuting, the amount of time spent at work is not included in any of the 
analyses and the results tend to vary depending upon whether the focus is on explaining 
neighborhood civic engagement versus broader political participation, and whether the predictor 
is individual-level versus aggregate commuting.  In the end, the existing research provides an 
inadequate answer to the question of whether the persistent routine of work and commuting 
impacts citizens’ level of political engagement.  
Beyond a Quantity-Focus: Time-Use, Negative Emotions, and Psychological Resources 
 
Beyond these core shortcomings in the literature, one problem we find in the current 
research that is more foundational and theoretical in nature pertains to the resources framework 
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itself. One inherently problematic feature of the resources model is that it presumes that any 
activity that consumes free time should, by virtue of this property, decrease political 
participation. In other words, the model presumes an equivalence in impact on political 
engagement of an additional unit of time spent working, commuting, or doing any obligatory 
activity that consumes the finite hours in one’s day. Thus, this model possesses a strong quantity-
focus coupled with agnosticism with respect to the qualitative impacts of different obligatory 
activities. This can be summarized by the prediction that any activity that consumes one’s finite 
free time should decrease participation, and the greater quantity of time you spend on this 
activity, the more it should decrease engagement with politics. This framework ignores the 
possibility that it is not just the amount of time spent performing some obligatory activity that 
matters, but also variation in the qualities of these activities, such as experienced differences in 
the psychological impact of the activity.  
In contrast to the resources model, the theory of ego depletion (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, 
Muraven, & Tice, 1998) argues that general acts of volition (making decisions, taking 
responsibility, planning actions, initiating planned behavior, etc.) draw upon and deplete a 
limited “will power” type of psychological resource that is akin to one’s finite stores of physical 
strength or energy. The core prediction of ego depletion theory is that engaging in one act of 
volition will, by its consumption of limited ego resources, have a detrimental impact on 
engagement in subsequent acts of volition. While ego depletion theory has been used to study a 
wide range of behaviors, it has yet to be firmly applied to explaining any type of standard 
political behavior, such as political participation. A key feature of the ego depletion framework, 
that pits it against the resources model with respect to the predicted effects of work and commute 
on participation, is its recognition that activities may vary in terms of their depletion of ego 
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resources. For example, deliberating over a decision of minor importance may not have the same 
depleting effect as engaging in major acts of self-restraint, such as resisting the urge to smoke a 
cigarette. This characteristic of the depletion framework serves as the major contrast point to the 
resources model by suggesting the possibility that some features of the daily grind, by 
differentially depleting ego resources, may erode political engagement more than others.  
In the present case, we translate this feature of the ego depletion framework into the 
prediction that time spent commuting, on average, will have a more pronounced negative effect 
on political engagement than time spent working. We label this the commuter’s strain 
hypothesis. This opposing prediction to the resources model is grounded in the presumption that 
a unit increase in time spent commuting, on average, leads to a greater consumption of ego 
resources rather than a unit increase in time spent working. This presumption is strongly 
supported by various veins of research across multiple disciplines that converge upon the 
conclusion that commuting is an onerous burden over and above the workday, and one which is 
experienced, on average, more negatively than the burden of being at one’s job. Put succinctly, 
while many Americans do experience some degree of dissatisfaction with their job, the majority 
of those who commute, especially over 45 minutes each way, strongly dislike commuting and 
report high levels of experienced frustration from commuting
3
.  
First and foremost, while burnout and stress are documented psychological phenomena 
associated with work and commuting (Koslowsky, Kluger, & Reich, 1995; Maslach & Jackson, 
1981), behavioral economics research on subjective well-being suggests a non-equivalence in the 
psychological impact of an additional unit of time spent commuting versus working. For 
example, relative to all other daily activities, including work, commuting has been reported as 
                                                          
3
 Based upon reported levels of job satisfaction from the U.S. Work and Family Life Study, 1980-2000, and reported 
levels of disliking of one’s commute from the 2005 ABC News/Washington Post and the 2005 Washington Post 
D.C. Region Traffic Polls.  
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the daily activity producing the absolute lowest level of positive affect and high relative levels of 
negative affect (Kahneman et al., 2004). Moreover, Kahneman et al. (2004) find that the net 
affect rating (i.e. positive affect minus negative affect) for commuting is significantly lower than 
that for work, and Kahneman and Krueger (2006) demonstrate that the proportion of time spent 
engaged in an activity where the dominant emotion is negative is much higher for commuting 
than for working.  
This research strongly comports with clinical and industrial psychology research 
documenting the presence of a range of stressors experienced from commuting that are typically 
absent in the workplace (e.g. noise, crowds, uncomfortable temperature, pollution, traffic 
congestion, earlier wake times, fear of tardiness) that can produce negative effects on personal 
physical and mental health and family life (Costa et al., 1988; Koslowsky et al., 1995; Novaco & 
Collier, 1994). Given the range of stressors introduced into one’s day from commuting, it is not 
surprising that commuters, on average, report lower levels of life satisfaction than non-
commuters (Bunker et al., 1992; Stutzer & Frey, 2008). Taken together, this research strongly 
suggests that commuting involves a weightier “withdrawal” from citizens’ daily “bank” of 
psychological resources than time at the job. Beyond the effect of stressors during commuting 
not present during time at the job, time commuting could be experienced more negatively 
because citizens’ subjective well-being may be anchored at an equilibrium point on the day-to-
day that automatically accounts for time on the job, whereas commuting is experienced as a 
burdensome intrusion into the precious few non-working hours in the day.  
In short, we find ourselves with two competing hypotheses with respect to the expected 
effect of the daily grind on citizen participation. Leading past research in the participation 
literature offers a resources hypothesis, which argues that an increase in time spent at work or 
10 
 
commuting should both exert negative effects on participation in political life. This prediction is 
based in the logic that free time is an essential resource for participation, and increased time at 
the job and commuting to and from work mutually consumes limited free time. In contrast, the 
commuter’s strain hypothesis, grounded in the ego depletion framework, suggests that 
commuting should strongly decrease participation, and that the effects of commuting should 
dwarf the effects—if any—of time spent working. This prediction is based upon psychological 
literature suggesting that different performed activities can be qualitatively distinct from one 
another with respect to the negative emotions they produce and their consumption of self 
resources. To solidify the strain hypothesis, we matched our underlying ego depletion framework 
with abundant evidence regarding the negativity with which individuals experience commuting 
absolutely and relative to work. We now move directly to a test of these competing perspectives, 
and follow our discussion of the results from this initial test with the explication of a 
comprehensive model of the daily grind that synthesizes the SES and resources models with the 
ego depletion framework to generate a model of the effects of the daily grind that accounts for 
psychological resources, income, and political interest.  
DATA AND METHODS 
To test these competing hypotheses concerning the effect of the daily grind of working 
and commuting on Americans’ level of participation in politics, we draw upon the 2005 
Citizenship, Involvement, Democracy Survey (CID) conducted by the Center for Democracy and 
Civil Society at Georgetown University (Howard, Gibson, & Stolle, 2005). This survey is 
comprised of 1,001 face-to-face interviews of adult Americans throughout the contiguous United 
States. The survey was conducted between May 16 and July 19, 2005, and employed a cluster-
sample design, achieving an overall response rate of 40 percent. To test our hypotheses regarding 
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the effects of work and commuting, our analyses are necessarily restricted to the 590 respondents 
reporting engaging in paid work
4
.   
We rely upon straight forward measures of working and commuting. The CID contains 
an item asking respondents to report the number of hours in the average week that they engage in 
paid work in both office and home workplaces. From this item, we created a variable labeled 
Time at Job, which is the average reported hours per week spent working divided by five, thus 
yielding a measure of the average hours per day spent working in the typical five day work week 
( =8.36,  =2.41). Next, the CID contains an item, which we label Time Commuting, which asked 
respondents engaging in paid work to report how long in minutes on a typical day it takes them 
to get to work ( =19.82,  =13.60)5.  
Despite the relatively modest size of the sample of working adults from the CID, we find 
that the estimated time spent working and commuting from this sample compare very well to 
those of larger samples of Americans. For example, the 2005 American Time-Use Survey 
conducted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)—which draws upon a sample of roughly 
13,000 individuals—finds that the average hours per weekday spent working in 2005 was 8.36, 
which is identical to the estimated mean hours per day spent working among the 590 CID 
respondents.  In terms of commuting, 33.2 percent of working respondents in the CID reported 
commuting 30 minutes or more to work daily, which is comparable, though slightly lower, than 
the figure of 37.4 percent estimated from the 2006 American Community Survey (ACS) of the 
U.S. Census Bureau. Further, despite being conducted in the mid 2000’s, the estimated averages 
                                                          
4
 Beyond our theoretical interest in working Americans as our population of interest, this restriction is also induced 
by the nature of the CID survey, because respondents were asked about their work status, and only those reporting 
being in the workforce were then asked about their commute time to work.  
5
 Unfortunately, the CID does not contain any items assessing respondents mode of commuting (i.e. drive alone, 
carpooling, mass transit, etc.); thus, for the purposes of the present analysis, we are unable to engage questions 
regarding heterogeneity in the impacts of commuting across commuting types. Despite this limitation in the data, the 
data present does provide us with an opportunity to assess the general impact of commuting times pooled across 
commuting types.   
12 
 
of working and commuting from the CID are within reasonable bounds of recent figures. The 
BLS estimated that the average hours per weekday spent working  in 2011 was 7.95, which 
represents a slight decrease from 2005, likely due to increased part-time employment in the wake 
of the 2008 financial crisis.  Additionally, the 2011 ACS estimated that roughly 38.6 percent of 
American workers commute 30 minutes or more per day to work. The closeness of the figures 
for working and commuting from the CID to those from the BLS and ACS—both in 2005 and 
more recently—make it a desirable sample for making inferences about the general population of 
working Americans.  
To gauge variation in respondents’ level of political participation, we relied upon 8 
dichotomous items and one ordinal item in the CID tapping whether or not, or the degree to 
which, the respondent engaged in a particular form of participation. The 8 dichotomous items 
included whether or not the respondent voted in the 2004 Presidential Election (70.3%), and 
whether in the last 12 months the respondent contacted a politician/local government official 
(20.9%), worked in a political party/action group (8%), worked for the campaign of a candidate 
for political office (8.2%), worked for another political organization/association (4.8%), wore or 
displayed a campaign badge/sticker (22.4%), signed a petition (34.3%), and donated money to a 
political organization or group (20.2%). The ordinal item asked respondents to report how often 
they discuss politics/public affairs, ranging from (1)-"never" (11.5%) to (7)-"every day" (15%).  
Rather than creating a summative scale from these items, given their categorical nature, we 
created a Bartlett factor score from these items derived from the first factor of a factor analysis 
utilizing the polychoric correlations between these 10 items
6
. The combination of these items 
                                                          
6
 The results from a factor analysis performed on the polychoric correlations between these items reveals that only 1 
factor attained an Eigen value greater than 1 and that these items load highly on this single factor.  We chose to use 
the Bartlett method for scoring each respondent on this latent factor because Bartlett scores have the advantage of 
being unbiased estimates of the true factor scores (DiStefano, Zhu, & Mîndrillă, 2009).  
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into an overall measure of political participation is inline with leading past research (Brady et al. 
1995; Humphries 2001). This measure was recoded to range from 0 to 1 ( =.202,  =.237). The 
mean and standard deviation of this measure indicate that, consistent with standing findings on 
mass participation in the U.S., participation beyond two to three of the measured political acts 
tends to be the exception rather than the rule.  
 All of our analyses controlled for education, income, age, gender (1=male), race (dummy 
variables for Blacks and Hispanics), homeownership, tenure in one’s community, marital status, 
church attendance, political ideology, and strength of party identification. The inclusion of this 
set of controls is based upon their established relevance as predictors of political participation 
(Brady et al., 1995; Conway, 1991; Lewis-Beck et al., 2008; Rosenstone & Hansen, 1993; 
Timpone, 1998; Verba & Nie, 1972). For more information about the question wording and 
coding of these controls, see Appendix A. As a first cut in analyzing our data, we performed an 
OLS regression of political participation scores on time per day spent working and commuting 
and this set of control variables. Extant research has uncovered that contextual measures of 
residential mobility and aggregate commuting behavior—as indicators of neighborhood design 
and social capital— influence individual political participation (Hopkins & Williamson, 2012; 
Humphries, 2001). Further, these studies measuring contextual commuting behavior tend to find 
null results for individual commuting on participation. Given this, we sought to assess the 
robustness of the results from our initial OLS regression by re-estimating our model using a 
random-intercept multilevel model adding a series of relevant contextual controls. The CID 
provides information on the zip code of residence for each respondent; using this information, 
we drew upon the 2000 Decennial Census to obtain zip-level estimates for each respondent for 
the percent of workers commuting to work via driving alone, the percent of residents who lived 
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in a different house in 1995, median household income, the unemployment rate, the percent 
Hispanic, and total population size. These contextual variables have either been found in past 
research to be relevant in shaping political engagement or have been included as theoretically 
relevant controls in such analyses (Hopkins &Williamson, 2012; Humphries, 2001). For ease of 
interpretation, all variables were recoded to range from 0 to 1. 
Results 
 The results from our OLS and random intercept regression model are presented in Table 
1. Starting with the OLS regression, the results reveal that time at work exerted no effect on 
one’s level of political participation. Thus, an individual who works part days (4 hours per day), 
for example, is no more likely to engage in a higher level of political activity than an individual 
who works over a full shift per day (over 8 hours). This null finding contradicts both those of 
Putnam (2000) and Brady et al. (1995). In the case of Putnam (2000), however, the analysis 
focuses on community level engagement rather than broader political and electoral participation, 
which could be one basis for the discrepancy. In the case of Brady and colleagues, this finding 
clearly conflicts with their finding that an in increase in free time promotes participation, as work 
is the single highest consumer of the average American’s free time, and the results presented 
here reveal that those who have protracted workdays, and thus have minimal free time, are not 
less likely to participate in politics than their more leisured counterparts.  
In contrast to the finding for time spent working, the results in Table 1 reveal that an 
increase in time spent commuting significantly decreases participation in politics. Indeed, going 
from those who work from home, and thus do not commute at all, to those who commute 60 
minutes or more per day, we observe over a 12 percent drop in participation scores (based upon a 
0 to 1 scale). One possibility that needs to be explored is that the effect observed for individual 
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commuting on participation is spurious, and that our measure of individual commuting is 
capturing other relevant factors that are actually responsible for driving the effect. For example, 
our measure of commuting may be capturing residence in a social capital-impoverished, 
suburban “bedroom community,” which is characterized by higher levels of residential mobility 
and single-occupancy vehicle commuting.  
Extant research has identified residence in such communities as an environmental factor 
decreasing political participation (Hopkins & Williamson, 2012). To assess this possibility, as 
well as control for the potential effects of economic and ethnic context, we estimated a multilevel 
model containing a series of key contextual measures. The results in column 2 of Table 1 reveal 
that the basic dynamics between work, commuting, and participation hold after controlling for a 
series of contextual factors, specifically after controlling for residential mobility and the percent 
of commuters who drive alone. To be sure, while residing in a zip with more single-occupancy 
vehicle commuters was found to decrease individual participation, this effect failed to attain even 
a marginal level of statistical significance. This finding contradicts those of Hopkins and 
Williamson (2012), though it should be noted that our analysis relied upon zip-level measures 
rather than the tract-level estimates used in this prior work. Despite this, zip codes are a 
reasonable measure of respondents' proximate residential context, and our general purpose is to 
account for these contextual variables and demonstrate that our results for individual-level 
commuting are robust across multiple specifications of our participation model.  
Turning to the effects of the individual-level control variables in our models, we find 
results both consistent and inconsistent with prior research.  Consistent with past research, we 
find that political participation significantly increases with both education and strength of 
partisanship, that men are more likely to participate than women, and that participation increases 
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with home ownership and tenure in one's community.  Inconsistent with prior research, however, 
are the null effects observed for age, race, and church attendance.  In attempting to account for 
these inconsistent results, we should first reiterate that our sample is restricted to working 
citizens only, and not the general public, which is the sample upon which most prior 
participation research is based.  This aside, the major culprit for the lack of significance of age, 
race, and church attendance in our analysis is our use of a combined measure of political 
participation as our dependent variable.  Thus, our results may differ from those established by 
prior work in the field whose analyses tend to focus upon voting and a more limited set of 
campaign-related participatory behaviors.  While the constituent items in our analysis strongly 
load on a single factor, prior research has argued that different types of participation behaviors 
are associated with different constellations of predictors (e.g., Dalton, 2008). Thus, within the 
confines of our analysis, the controls emerging as significant are those that exert consistent and 
strong effects across constituent items, and thus strongly increase general political participation 
as a latent construct indicated by various behavioral measures.  
The results thus far provide support for the commuter’s strain hypothesis and evidence 
against the resources model. Indeed, when it comes to the daily grind of work and commuting, 
our results indicate that it is primarily the daily hassle of spending long times in transit to and 
from work that erodes engagement in the political arena. Finding that long hours spent at work 
exerts no effect on participation—while long commutes do—strongly suggests the insufficiency 
of the simple quantity-based approach offered by the resources model. Despite consuming much 
more of one’s total free time per day than even the longest commute, long work hours had no 
effect on participation, suggesting that it may not be the quantity of time spent engaging in some 
obligatory daily activity, but the quality of this time. For the majority of citizens, the obligatory 
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economic role of income earner supersedes the mostly voluntary political role of citizen, and our 
findings thus far provides some suggestive evidence in favor of a more psychological approach 
toward theorizing the nature of the relationship between these role domains. Rather than just 
focusing on how time spent performing one role leaves less time for the other, our results suggest 
the importance of the experience of negative emotions and the depletion of psychological 
resources associated with specific obligatory activities that erode the resources needed to engage 
in acts of volition—such as voluntary participation in politics.  
EXPLAINING THE EFFECT OF COMMUTING ON POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT 
 Having found that individual commuting significantly decreases engagement in political 
activities, the remaining task is to illuminate why this is the case. What is the causal process 
translating spending more time commuting, and presumably a greater depletion of ego resources, 
into decreased political engagement? In the following sections we aim to unpack this finding and 
incrementally construct a comprehensive model of the impact of the daily grind on political 
participation. We synthesize the resources, SES, and ego depletion framework into one 
mediated-moderated effects model (Baron & Kenny, 1986; Muller, Judd, & Yzerbyt, 2005), 
where, in theory, those of low income are the most “ground down” by longer commutes, and the 
impact of commuting on behavioral participation is theorized to occur via its erosion of one’s 
level of psychological engagement in politics—as captured by political interest. 
Interest as a Mediating Variable 
 One longstanding axiom from the political participation literature is that being interested 
in politics and public affairs represents a central psychological involvement with politics that 
strongly motivates participatory behavior (Brady et al., 1995; Campbell et al., 1960; Conway, 
1991; Lewis-Beck et al., 2008). While interest in politics is known to be promoted by factors 
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such as education and age, we believe that an additional and essential basis for psychological 
involvement with politics is the possession of the actual psychological resources necessary to 
fuel mental and emotional involvement in extra-obligatory activities. Drawing upon the ego 
depletion framework, one well-grounded prediction is that routine engagement in externally 
imposed, disliked, and thus depleting activities, such as commuting, should undermine interest in 
politics by depleting the stock of “residual” psychological resources left-over at the end of the 
workday for one to invest in engaging with politics. While not ruling out apathy as intrinsic to 
some citizens, the ego depletion framework does lend itself toward viewing political apathy as an 
indicator of being in “conservation mode,” whereby high levels of ego depletion and cognitive 
and emotional exhaustion render non-obligatory activities superfluous as a necessary means for 
the restoration of psychological resources (Baumeister et al., 1998). Thus, we hypothesize that 
one key mechanism through which the daily grind of long commuting times diminishes political 
participation is by the whittling down of interest in politics. In addition to being grounded in ego 
depletion theory, past research has found that interest in politics serves as a key intervening 
variable between aggregate-level commuting and political participation (Humphries, 2001).  
Income as a Moderating Variable 
 Having argued for the importance of interest in politics as a primary intervening variable 
between commuting and participation, we now make an argument for the role of income in 
conditioning the impact of commuting on political interest. We offer several reasons for why we 
believe that income should moderate the effect of commuting on interest. First and foremost, we 
believe that the financial compensation an individual earns from working represents a benefit 
that offsets the costs associated with work. Commuting without a doubt represents a crucial 
transaction cost associated with work and earning an income, and the higher the level of one’s 
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compensation for their work, the more likely it is that the incurrence of such costs will be 
psychologically and materially justified. Thus, we principally view one’s earned income as an 
“offsetting factor,” whereby the strain of commuting—and thus the depletion of ego resources—
is offset by the acquisition of monetary resources that confer a host of countervailing effects. 
Within the ego depletion literature, a handful of work has emerged that explore the 
factors conditioning the degree of depletion experienced by engaging in acts of volition, as well 
as the general means by which the resources of the self are replenished following depletion. For 
example, existing research demonstrates that experiencing positive events after work offsets ego 
depletion and fatigue induced by the workday (Gross et al., 2011). Further, extant research 
demonstrates that the experience of positive emotions (Tice et al., 2007) and, most importantly, 
self-affirmation (Schmeichel & Vohs, 2009), each possess the capacity of offsetting the amount 
of depletion experienced from engaging in various ego depleting acts. Applied to the present 
case, we view income as a key factor capable of offsetting the strain of commuting by facilitating 
positive events and emotions via enhancing one’s capacity for discretionary utility maximization 
(i.e., acquiring desired goods and services). Beyond this, however, we also view income as an 
offsetting factor to the strain of a long commute by facilitating self-affirmation—defined as 
“behavioral or cognitive events that bolster the perceived integrity of the self and one’s overall 
moral and adaptive adequacy” (Schmeichel & Vohs, 2009; Steele, 1988). Thus, for lower income 
commuters, not only is the cost of a long commute associated with lower material compensation, 
it may also be associated—because of lower compensation—with a diminished basis or capacity 
for self-affirmation relative to those commuting to higher paying jobs.  
In short, we hypothesize that income, by offsetting the degree of depletion experienced 
by the strain of commuting, should moderate the degree to which commuting erodes interest in 
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politics. Among lower income commuters, we hypothesize that the strain of commuting should 
be maximized, and thus the amount of self resources necessary for psychological involvement 
with politics should be at a minimum. This effect, however, should be attenuated among higher 
income commuters, who, according to our framework, should be better able to offset or justify 
the strain of commuting, and thus should be more likely to have greater psychological resources 
available for investing in extra-obligatory cognitive exertions, such as attending to public affairs.  
Beyond grounding this hypothesis within the ego depletion framework, we should note 
the theoretical possibility that income may moderate the effect of commuting on interest for 
reasons other than shaping the amount of depletion offset. Two possibilities stand out: first, 
income may shape the type of commuting one engages in, and second, income may shape how 
one spends their time during their commute. In the former case, the stressors associated with 
commuting, such as noise, vibration, overcrowding, or pollution, maybe associated with certain 
types of commuting (i.e. mass transit vs. single car driver) that themselves are correlated with 
income. This first alternative possibility, however, could be ruled out given evidence that, 
variation in modes of commuting aside, higher income commuters are no less dissatisfied or 
frustrated with their commuting than low income commuters
7
. In addition to the absence of a 
relationship between income and satisfaction with commute, we should also note that, within the 
confines of the CID data, there is no correlation between income level and time spent commuting 
in the first place (r=.037). In the latter case, higher income individuals may use the time during 
their commute in a way that promotes interest in politics. For example, those with higher 
incomes are significantly more likely than those with lower incomes to listen to political talk 
                                                          
7Based upon separate bivariate regressions of reported levels of (1) disliking of one’s commute and (2) frustration 
with one’s commute on personal income and the finding that income exerted an insignificant effect in both 
regressions. Analyses based upon data from the 2005 ABC News/Washington Post Traffic Poll.  
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radio
8
 and read the news during their commutes
9
. Given that we know that income tends to be 
associated with political interest in the first place, it is also possible that, the strain from 
commuting withstanding, a relationship of reciprocal causation sets in among higher income 
commuters. This reciprocal causation can be characterized by income heightening political 
interest, which increases the likelihood of engaging with politics as a method of spending time 
during their commute, which in turn reinforces and magnifies interest. Taken together, the 
remaining theoretical possibilities—depletion offset and time-use during commute—each point 
toward the same hypothesis: namely, that income should moderate the effect of commuting on 
political interest.  
The Daily Grind: A Comprehensive Mediated Moderated Effects Model 
 In the prior two sections we argue that political interest should mediate the effect of the 
daily grind of commuting on political participation, and that individual income should moderate 
the effect of commuting on political interest. In short, we have explicated a comprehensive 
model where the effect of commuting on political interest is moderated by income, and the 
moderated effect of commuting on political participation is mediated by political interest. In 
essence, this model reflects an attempt to synthesize the SES and resources models with the ego 
depletion framework. We provide a graphical depiction of our full theoretical model in Panel A 
of Figure 1. In Panel A, we begin the causal process with obligatory daily activities, with a 
present focus on commuting. From this box, we see an arrow pointing toward “intervening 
factors,” with interest in politics serving as the variable of main interest hypothesized to mediate 
                                                          
8
 Based upon 2004 NES data asking respondents whether or not they listen to political talk radio; a difference in 
means test by income indicates that average income is significantly higher among those who listen compared to 
those who do not (t=6.16, df=977, p<.001).   
9
 Based upon combined data from the 2005 ABC/Washington Post National Traffic Poll (N=1,204) and the 2005 
Washington Post D.C. Region Traffic Poll (N=1,003). Both polls asked respondents whether or not they ever read a 
newspaper to pass the time during their commute. A bivariate logistic regression analysis revealed that income 
significantly increased the probability of reading the news during one’s commute (B=.178, SE=.078, p<.05).  
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the impact of commuting on political participation. Situated in the center above obligatory daily 
activities and intervening factors is a box labeled “Offsetting Factors”; the position of this box 
and its downward pointing arrow is intended to indicate its status as a factor moderating the 
effect of obligatory activities on our intervening variable. Last, at the end of the causal process, 
we our have our outcome variable of interest—political participation—and an arrow pointing 
from the intervening factor of political interest toward participation.  Accompanying this 
graphical depiction of the main components of our theoretical model, we explicitly list the three 
hypotheses we intend to test along their relevant path arrows within the model.  
Analysis 
 To test our comprehensive daily grind model, we estimated a mediated-moderated effects 
(see Baron & Kenny, 1986; Muller et al., 2005) structural equation model (SEM).  This type of 
SEM allows us to represent our theoretical model in empirical form, where income is modeled to 
moderate the impact of commuting on political interest, and political interest is modeled to 
mediate the impact of commuting on political participation.  Further, estimation of a SEM allows 
us to obtain the indirect effect of commuting on political participation through its effect on 
interest in politics.  
 Our SEM included three mediating variables. First, we included a measure of political 
interest based upon an item in the CID asking respondents to report their level of interest in 
politics. This four ordered category item ranges from (1)-“not at all interested” to (4)-“very 
interested.” To properly specify our mediation model, we included two indicators of social 
capital and neighborhood involvement, as both have been demonstrated in prior research to 
mediate the relationship between commuting and participation. The first variable measures how 
frequently a respondent talks to their neighbors; this variable ranges from (1)-“Never,” to (7)-
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“Just about everyday,” and is labeled Talk to Neighbors. Second, we include an item tapping 
whether respondents have ever tried to work together with their neighbors to fix or improve 
something in their neighborhood. This variable has three ordered categories—ranging from (1)-
“no” to (3)=“yes, tried more than once”—and is labeled Fix Neighborhood Problem.  
 Our SEM simultaneously estimated four regression equations. Three of these equations 
involved the separate regression of each of the three mediating variables on working, 
commuting, income, multiplicative terms between income and working and commuting, and 
controls. The fourth equation involved the regression of political participation on working, 
commuting, income, multiplicative terms between income and working and commuting, the 
three mediating variables, and controls. This SEM allows us to estimate the direct effects of 
commuting on our mediating variables conditional upon levels of income and the indirect effects 
of commuting on political participation through the effect of commuting on our mediating 
variables conditional upon levels of income and the effect of our mediating variables on political 
participation. Due to the categorical nature of our mediating variables, we used ordered probit 
link functions for these models and estimated the parameters using mean and variance adjusted 
weighted least squares in the software package Mplus® (Muthén and Muthén, 2007).  
Results 
 The results from our SEM are presented in Table 2. We begin with the moderated effects 
of time spent working and commuting on our mediating variables. Starting with time on the job, 
the insignificant constituent and interaction terms reveal that time spent working—regardless of 
income level—exerted no significant effects on any of the mediating variables. Turning to 
commuting, the constituent terms for time spent commuting are negative and significant for all 
three mediating variables. Of principal interest for us is the effect of commuting on interest in 
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politics; the results indicate that among those at the lowest end of the income distribution, an 
increase in time spent commuting significantly decreases interest in politics (B=-1.26, SE=.527). 
In substantive terms, moving from no commute to a commute of 60 minutes or more among 
workers at the lowest income level was associated with a decrease of .23 in the probability of 
being “very interested” in politics and a .25 decrease in the probability of  being only “somewhat 
interested”10. The positive and statistically significant interaction between commuting and 
income (B=2.33, SE=.917) indicates that the marginal effect of commuting, as income increases 
from its minimum, returns to zero and turns positive, such that among those at the highest 
income category, an increase in commuting is found to increase political interest
11
. The effects of 
commuting on knowing one’s neighbors and working with them to solve some problem are 
consistent with those for interest in politics. Indeed, while low income long distance commuters 
are less likely to know their neighbors or work with them to solve some problem, higher income 
long distance commuters are more likely to know and work with their neighbors.  
Turning to income, the results for the mediating variables reveal that, among those 
working the least and not commuting, an increase in income is associated with a significant 
decrease in talking to one’s neighbors and working with them to fix some neighborhood 
                                                          
10
 These effects are based upon post-estimation analysis of predicted probabilities from a stand-alone ordered  probit 
regression model, which yielded parameter estimates nearly identical to those from the SEM.  We do this for ease of 
interpretation, as effects based upon the stand-alone ordered probit model are directly interpretable as changes in the 
probability of specific values of the dependent variable, whereas estimated effects from our SEM would require 
interpretation in terms of standard deviation unit changes in the latent continuous variable underlying the observed 
categorical political interest variable.    
11
 In addition to being moderated by income, it is also possible that other variables, such as education and partisan 
identification strength, moderate the impact of work and commuting on interest in politics. Given that both are 
known predictors of interest in politics, it may be the case that longer workdays and commutes strongly erode 
political interest among less educated and partisan citizens, while interest in politics among well-educated and 
highly partisan citizens may be resilient to the psychologically taxing effect of long workdays and commutes.  We 
tested these possibilities by re-estimating the model presented in Table 2 including interactions between daily work 
and education and party ID strength, as well as daily commuting and education and party ID strength.  The results 
from this model reveal that neither work nor commuting interacted with education or partisan identification strength.  
Further, the interaction between commuting and income completely holds in the presence of these additional 
multiplicative terms.  
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problem. The significant interactions between income and commuting for these latter two 
mediating variables indicate that an increase in income among long distance commuters reverses 
the social isolation seemingly found among wealthy non-commuters. Among long distance 
commuters, an increase in income is associated with a significant increase in knowing ones 
neighbors and working with them to solve some neighborhood problem. This finding clearly 
conflicts with findings by Putnam (2000), who finds that commuting unequivocally decreases 
civic engagement, at least as measured by various forms of membership and participation in 
community and civic organizations.  
Up to this point, we find strong evidence in support for our expectation that lower income 
individuals will be the most “ground down” by longer time spent commuting on the day-to-day. 
Next, we turn to the results for the political participation equation in our SEM, which are 
presented in the final results column of Table 2. We specifically turn our attention to the results 
for the three mediating variables. As the results reveal, interest in politics is associated with a 
highly significant increase in political participation. Moreover, the effect of interest is 
moderately large in size, as a unit increase in interest is associated with over a 9 percent increase 
in participation and movement from minimum to maximum levels of interest rendered a .29 
increase in participation. In addition to interest, working with one’s neighbors to solve some 
problem was associated with a significant increase in participation in politics and talking to one’s 
neighbors exerted a marginally significant positive effect on participation. Of the three 
mediators, interest in politics has the largest effect on participation. At present, then, we have 
observed that commuting among low income individuals is associated with a significant decrease 
in political interest, and that political interest is as associated with a significant increase in 
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participation. All that is left to determine is whether longer commutes, by eroding interest among 
low income commuters, indirectly decreases political participation.  
The answer to this question is provided in the bottom row of Table 3, which lists the 
indirect effects for time spent commuting on political participation through the effects of 
commuting on each of the three mediating variables. The results reveal that the indirect effect for 
commuting on participation via political interest (B= -.123, SE=.053) is the largest and only 
statistically significant effect of the three indirect effects
12
. The negative sign of this path 
coefficient indicates that the daily grind of long commuting times indirectly decreases political 
participation among low income commuters by eroding their interest in politics and public 
affairs. For further illustration, these core results are graphically portrayed in Panel B of Figure 
1. Panel B lists the direct effect of an increase in commuting among those with the lowest 
incomes on political interest, the direct effect of interest on participation, and the indirect effect 
of commuting among poor Americans on participation as mediated through political interest. 
Despite the fact that the 9 items in our participation measure strongly load on a single factor, 
analysis of the effects of commuting on this combined measure may conceal potential 
heterogeneity in the effect of commuting across the separate forms of participation. In Table 3, 
we disaggregate the findings presented in Table 2 (and Panel B of Figure 1) into the effects of 
commuting among lower income citizens on the 9 participation items separately.  As can be 
seen, political interest significantly increases the probability of engaging in each type of 
behavior, and commuting in turn (among those with the lowest incomes) indirectly decreases 
engagement in each type of participatory behavior via its diminution of political interest. Taken 
                                                          
12
 Recent work on causal mediation analysis (Imai, Keele, Tingley, & Yamamoto, 2011) suggests the use of 
alternative methods to the “product-of-coefficients” method (employed by Mplus) for assessing mediated effects. 
We re-estimated our participation and political interest equations using the method recommended by Imai et al. 
(2011) to assess the indirect effect of commuting on participation via political interest, and the results from this 
analysis corroborate those obtained from Mplus: ACME= -.0898, CI= -.167, -.005. The ACME is the average effect 
of commuting on participation that operates through political interest.  
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together, these findings strongly support our hypotheses, and paint a comprehensive picture of 
the causal process linking the daily grind to participation in ways that incorporate resources and 
psychological engagement, and thus build theoretical bridges between our ego depletion 
framework and the SES and resources models of participation.  
CONCLUSION 
 In this article, we explored the relationship between the obligatory daily endeavors 
carried out by individuals and their performance as citizen participants in the political process. 
Of specific importance, given the spread of commuting and increases in commuting times over 
the past quarter century, was the analysis of whether the hassle of individual commuting 
decreases political engagement. We offered the commuter’s strain hypothesis, and cast this as 
opposing predictions based from the resources model. While our strain hypothesis contests the 
quantity-focus and agnosticism of the resources model with respect to the psychological and 
emotional impacts of different consumers of one’s free time, we ultimately do not view these two 
frameworks as necessarily opposing one another. Indeed, our daily grind framework seeks to 
expand the resources model to include ego resources as one of the most vital resources for 
participation, alongside time and money. Our daily grind model situating ego resources as 
antecedent to engagement reveals that ego depleting activities—such as commuting long 
distances on a daily basis—can erode interest in politics and ultimately diminish participation 
through their erosion of psychological engagement with public affairs.  
 The findings presented in this article have several implications for democratic citizenship 
and representation. First, the findings illustrate the interdependence of our lives as workers, the 
design of our built environments, and mass participation. While work itself exerted no effect on 
participation, the amount of time spent getting to and from work does. The way we design our 
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environment is intimately related to the geography of local and regional job markets and these 
together strongly induce commuting. In areas lacking efficient and cost effective mass transit—
which encompasses the majority of non-urban areas in the U.S.—this requires single car driver 
commuting, which has been particularly tied to stress and social isolation (Lidström, 2006; 
Novaco & Collier, 1994).  Campaigns, political parties, and other organizations in the U.S. invest 
large sums of resources encouraging citizens to participate in the democratic process; a major 
take home point of our findings is that large-scale efforts to mobilize American citizens should 
consider addressing the day-to-day forces at work in contemporary American life that erode 
political interest and engagement. While the accessibility of voting places and presence of 
logistical obstacles are apparent variables shaping mass participation, our findings, and those of 
others, suggest that local policies shaping the design of communities and the amount of 
commuting play an important, though less obvious, role in influencing the amount of public 
engagement in the political sphere.  In short, if we are serious about enabling citizens to be more 
participatory in politics, then we should also discuss what can be done to lessen the day-to-day 
burdens on citizens that erode the resources necessary for habitual political participation.  
 Our most striking finding is that lower income citizens are the one’s most depoliticized 
by the resource depleting demands of daily life. As it is, lower income citizens tend to be 
considerably less represented by government policies than their higher income counterparts (e.g., 
Bartels, 2008; Gilens, 2012), and this has been linked to their tendency to not participate in the 
political process. As we know, participation in the political arena is not without its costs, and 
involves both barriers to entry and sustained involvement. Higher income individuals, by 
definition endowed with more money and typically more education, civic skills, and free time, 
are more likely to be able overcome these barriers than lower income citizens. This article argues 
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that an additional barrier for lower income citizens may be the mental and emotional self-
resources necessary to engage in acts of volition above and beyond those required for basic daily 
subsistence. While higher income individuals are not immune from having to commute, this 
article reveals that the negative effect of commuting with respect to political interest and 
participation is entirely concentrated among the lower working class.  
Thus, in the end, our research suggests that the societal forces thrusting commuting upon 
American citizens is working to further marginalize an already politically marginal and 
underrepresented social stratum from the democratic process. The findings from this article 
suggest that lower income commuters, while perhaps in high need of upping their level of 
interest advocacy on matters of labor and wages, taxation, redistribution, social welfare, and 
planning and transportation, will be less likely to do so because their current situation has left 
them depleted of key resources needed for such action. This dynamic points to the importance of 
mobilization for the participation of lower income Americans, particularly those dealing with the 
daily grind of commuting long distances to presumably low paying jobs. Indeed, while lower 
income commuters would undeniably benefit from policies aimed at improving their wages and 
reorganizing built landscapes and job markets to reduce commuting, their ability to insert this 
interest as an input into formal decision making processes may require facilitation from third 
party advocacy organizations that either provide the representation for them or subsidize the 
costs of their participation in various ways.  
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Table 1.     The Effect of Daily Work and Commute on Political Participation  
 
Individual-Level  
Model 
Model with  
Contextual Variables 
Individual-Level 
   
 
Time at Job .017 (.070) .031 (.071) 
Time Commuting -.120** (.040) -.098* (.040) 
Education .238*** (.039) .240*** (.041) 
Income .058 (.051) .090 (.053) 
Age -.006 (.058) .017 (.059) 
Gender .036* (.019) .035 (.019) 
Black .011 (.027) -.008 (.030) 
Hispanic .013 (.031) .035 (.037) 
Homeowner .041* (.021) .034 (.022) 
Tenure in Community .171** (.058) .135* (.060) 
Married -.032 (.020) -.028 (.020) 
Church Attendance .008 (.036) .016 (.037) 
Ideology -.021 (.042) -.017 (.043) 
Partisan Strength .102*** (.026) .101*** (.027) 
Zip code-Level 
   
 
% Drive Alone to Work 
  
-.104 (.094) 
% Lived Different House 95-00 
  
.062 (.070) 
Median Household Income 
  
-.170** (.064) 
Unemployment Rate 
  
-.042 (.116) 
% Hispanic 
  
-.116 (.077) 
Total Population 
  
.002 (.065) 
Constant .051 (.050) .059 (.111) 
Level-2 (Zip code) Error Variance 
  
.002 (.002) 
Level-1 (Individual) Error Variance 
  
.043 (.003) 
Rho 
  
.044 
Likelihood Ratio Test 
  
.93 
# of Individuals (Level-1 Units)  590 566 
# of Zip codes (Level-2 Units) 
 
168 
Notes: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients from an OLS regression and a Random Intercept Regression Model 
using Maximum Likelihood Estimation. Likelihood ratio test compares the random intercept model to a “completely pooled” 
model, testing against the null hypothesis that level-2 error variance is equal to zero. * significant at .05, ** significant at .01, 
*** significant at .001. Reported significance is based upon two-tailed hypothesis tests. 
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Figure 1: Comprehensive Model of the Effect of the Daily Grind on Political Participation 
Panel A: Full Integrated Theoretical Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Core Empirical Model & Results 
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Table 2.    The Mediated-Moderated Effect of the “Daily Grind” on Political Participation 
 
Mediating Variables  
 
Interest in  
Politics 
Talk to  
Neighbors 
Fix Neighbor- 
-hood Problem 
 
Political  
Participation 
Time at Job .380 (.800) -.032 (.134) -.565 (.771) -.061 (.179) 
Time Commuting -1.26* (.527) -.269** (.102) -1.59* (.823) .143 (.116) 
Income -.629 (.676) -.253* (.123) -1.71* (.725) .187 (.124) 
Time at Job   Income -.525 (1.52) .163 (.266) 2.71 (1.52) -.058 (.289) 
Time Commuting   Income 2.33* (.917) .480* (.197) 2.64* (1.38) -.475* (.208) 
Interest in Politics 
  
    .098*** (.008) 
Talk to Neighbors 
  
    .034 (.031) 
Fix Neighborhood Problem 
  
    .042*** (.010) 
Education 1.06*** (.196) -.037 (.043) .282 (.291) .124** (.043) 
Age .314 (.289) -.022 (.064) .270 (.390) -.021 (.050) 
Gender .344*** (.097) .009 (.021) .334* (.133) -.013 (.020) 
Black -.108 (.142) .034 (.031) .267 (.177) .008 (.025) 
Hispanic .029 (.159) -.056 (.032) .256 (.211) -.001 (.036) 
Homeowner .113 (.110) .058* (.023) .210 (.150) .020 (.020) 
Tenure in Community .661* (.306) .037 (.066) .591 (.386) .080 (.053) 
Married .056 (.106) .004 (.024) .045 (.137) -.040* (.019) 
Church Attendance .032 (.190) .049 (.041) .038 (.241) .001 (.035) 
Ideology .061 (.213) -.045 (.050) -.046 (.283) -.026 (.037) 
Partisan Strength .568*** (.137) -.010 (.031) .277 (.178) .034 (.027) 
Intercept 
  
.743*** (.073)   -.068 (.096) 
Thresholds 
  
      
  Cut1 -.205 (.398)   1.16* (.479)   
  Cut2 .649 (.398)   1.61*** (.477)   
  Cut3 2.14*** (.406)       
N 590 590 590 590 
Indirect Effects of Time Commuting 
  
      
  Political Interest 
  
    -.123* (.053) 
  Talk to Neighbors 
  
    -.009 (.009) 
  Fix Neighborhood Problem 
  
    -.067 (.038) 
Notes: Mean and Variance Adjusted Weighted Least Squares Estimates (WLSMV) using delta parameterization and 1,000 iterations in Mplus 
(v.5.21). For the models with ordinal dependent variables (Interest in Politics and Fix Neighborhood Problem), Mplus treats these variables as latent 
variables, thus the coefficient estimates for these models represent the standard deviation unit change in the latent variable underlying the ordinal 
response dependent variable associated with a unit change in the independent variable. For models with continuous dependent variables (Talk to 
Neighbors and Political Participation), the coefficient estimates for these models represent the change in the dependent associated with a unit change 
in the independent variable. * significant at .05, ** significant at .01, *** significant at .001. Reported significance is based upon two-tailed 
hypothesis tests. 
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Table 3. Indirect Effects of Commuting among Lower Income Commuters on Specific 
Forms of Political Participation 
 Direct Effect of 
Political Interest 
Indirect Effect of 
Commuting 
Voted in 2004  .176** (.064) -.222† (.121) 
Contact a Politician .442*** (.066) -.556* (.249) 
Worked for a Political Party .362*** (.085) -.455* (.202) 
Worked for Campaign .300** (.096) -.377* (.095) 
Worked for Political Organization .446*** (.108) -.560* (.274) 
Displayed Campaign Badge/Sticker .503*** (.083) -.633* (.285) 
Signed a Petition .332*** (.070) -.416* (.095) 
Donated Money  .560*** (.087) -.701* (.318) 
Discuss Politics/Public Affairs .945*** (.069) -1.19* (.506) 
Notes: Mean and Variance Adjusted Weighted Least Squares Estimates (WLSMV) using delta parameterization 
and 1,000 iterations in Mplus (v.5.21).  Indirect effects of commuting represent the impact of a one unit change 
in commuting (i.e., minimum to maximum as variable is recoded to range from 0 to 1) on each participation 
variable obtained through the effect of commuting on political interest (when income is set at its minimum 
value) and the impact of political interest in turn on each participation item.  †p<.10, *p<.05, **p<.01, 
***p<.001.  
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APPENDIX A 
Question Wording from 2005 Citizenship, Involvement, Democracy Survey 
Notes: Labels in parentheses are the label of each variable as appears in the CID survey. 
 
Education 
Respondents were asked to list the highest grade in school or year of college completed (EDUC2). Item 
has 8 response options: (1)-“None, or grade 1-8” (2)-"High school incomplete, grades 9-11" (3)-"High 
school graduate or GED" (4)-"Business, technical, or vocational school" (5)-"Some college, no 4 year 
degree" (6)-"College graduate" and (7)-“Post-graduate training/professional schooling after college.”   
 
Income 
My measure of respondent income was based upon a corrected and adjusted constructed income scale 
contained in the CID (INCOMEC) measuring respondents’ total annual net household income. This 
ordinal item has 11 categories: (1)-“Less than $15,000” (2)-"$15,000 but less than $20,000" (3)-"$20,000 
but less than $25,000" (4)-"$25,000 but less than $30,000" (5)-"$30,000 but less than $40,000" (6)-
"$40,000 but less than $50,000" (7)-"$50,000 but less than $75,000" (8)-"$75,000 but less than $100,000" 
(9)-"$100,000 but less than $150,000" (10)-"$150,000 but less than $200,000" and (11)-“$200,000 or 
more.” The variable constructed by the authors of the CID survey was based upon the original income 
question (HINCTNT) which contained 127 missing cases. The constructed variable (INCOMEC) imputed 
missing data using information about homeownership, interviewers' estimates of respondents' 
socioeconomic class, respondents' reported feelings about their current household income level, and a 
follow-up dichotomous question asking whether or not the respondents earns less or more than $50,000 a 
year. For more information about the construction of this variable, see: http://www.uscidsurvey.org/.  
 
Age 
Respondents were asked how old they were (AGE). Mean age was 45. When recoded to range from 0 to 
1, mean age is .37.  
 
Homeowner 
Respondents were asked whether any member of their household owns the house/apartment/property 
which they currently reside (OWNHOME). This variable is dichotomous, coded (1) for those answering 
“Yes,” and (0) for those answering “No.”  
 
Tenure in Community 
Respondents were asked how many years they have lived in their current area (YRLVDAE). This is a 
ratio level variable, recoded for our analysis to range from 0 to 1.  
 
Married 
Respondents were asked to report their legal relationship status (MARITAL). This item is nominal, and 
recoded into a dichotomous variable, where respondents reporting being married were coded (1), and all 
others (i.e. separated, divorced, widowed, never married) were coded (0).  
 
Church Attendance 
Respondents were asked to report, apart from weddings and funerals, how often they attend religious 
services (RLGATND). Respondents were given 7 response options: (1)-“Everyday” (2)-"More than once 
a week" (3)-"Once a week" (4)-"At least once a month" (5)-"Only on special holy days" and (7)-“Never.” 
This item was reverse coded for our analysis to range from low to high attendance of religious services. 
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Ideology 
Respondents were presented with the following question (LRSCALE): “We hear a lot of talk these days 
about liberals and conservatives. Where do you fall?” Respondents were given 11 response options, 
ranging from (0)-“liberal” to (10)-“conservative”.  
 
Partisan Strength 
This item was created by folding the 7 point partisanship scale into a four category ordinal partisan 
strength scale, where pure independents are coded “1,” leaners are coded “2,” partisans “3,” and strong 
partisans “4.”  
 
